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ON MULTILINEARITY OF SOCIALISM

1. The standard objections to historiosophy

There are certain standard objections to any theory of historical process. The very thought of establishing regularities in history is sometimes claimed to be methodologically corrupt (see Popper 1967, Kolakowski 1976-78, Heller 1982). According to another standard objection any theory of this kind necessarily leads to a unilinear vision of the historical process whereas even a simple observation tells us that historical reality is multilinear. This even allows some authors (see Bierdajew 1937, Berlin 1984) to claim that attempting to build a theory of historical process is morally abominable. One of the present authors has already had an opportunity to discuss the first objection (Nowak 1991, Appendix (vi)). This text will address the second and third problem. Let us begin with the claim that philosophy of history necessarily brings a unilinear model of the historical process.

This issue could be examined on methodological grounds by weighing abstract arguments. However, such a discussion is likely to escape any empirical control. Worse even, there exists the danger that axiological attitudes, i.e. people's feelings — even if they happened to be shared by everyone — about what kind of world they would like to live in, would start to aspire to the role of arguments. To avoid this situation it will be much better to consider the problem in terms that are as concrete as possible, that is to confront the above described objection with a specific theory of historical process.

We will proceed as follows. First, a fragment (Model I of the theory of triple-class system) of non-Marxian historical materialism will be summarized. We will show that not only does it allow but it even implies a multilinear picture of the historical process. Second, we will concretize the model in such a way, that the resulting model (I*) will give additional

reasons why the idealized historical process must be multilinear. Third, we will consider objections of ethical nature.

2. The development of a purely political society (Model I)

2.1. Assumptions

The subject of our analysis is the triple-rule system. We will make all idealizing assumptions of the non-Marxian historical materialism. We will consider a purely political society, consisting of only two classes — rulers and citizens (disposers and non-disposers of the means of coercion, respectively), without political institutions, socio-political doctrines, etc. We will also postulate that technology remains at a constant level and that the society is in total isolation, i.e. there are no external influences, etc.

The following assumptions are made about each class. Each ruler maximizes his own sphere of control over citizens' actions. Rulers refusing to do so are eliminated by competition. The global effect of such endeavors is the increase of the range of regulation as a whole. The sphere of individual actions not under the control of the rulers is termed the sphere of civil autonomy. The interest of the class of rulers consists in increasing the sphere of regulation, whereas the interest of the civil society consists in increasing the sphere of civil autonomy. For simplicity, it is assumed that all actions are equally important so that rulers are equally interested in controlling any individual action and, correlatively, citizens are equally interested in freeing any action from the control of the rulers. In the next section this last assumption will be waived.

The ratio of the sphere of regulation to the total amount of social actions is termed civil alienation. Civil resistance depends on the level of civil alienation and this relationship can be characterized as follows:

- (a) for low levels of civil alienation, resistance is also low — only social margins rebel (the area of class peace);
- (b) for moderate levels of civil alienation, civil resistance reaches its maximum (the area of revolutions of the first type), but
- (c) when the level of civil alienation increases even more, the level of civil resistance falls down quickly (the area of enslavement);
- (d) only an extremely high level of civil alienation leads again to the rebellion (the area of the revolution of the second type).

It is also assumed, that in the long run the sensitivity of the masses for repression disappears so that both revolutionary areas collapse into one "in the limit". To explain these assumptions more thoroughly it would be

necessary to introduce an anthropological construction underlying it. Instead of doing so we direct the attention of the readers to the papers in which this construction was developed (Nowak 1987a, 1993) and analyzed (Egert 1993, Paprzycki 1993). Model I is summarized after (Nowak 1987b).

2.2. Model I

Let us consider how the ideal type of society of Model I develops in time. Let us assume that in the initial stage our abstract society is in an area of class peace which implies a low range of regulation and an appropriately low level of civil resistance. Competition within the class of rulers forces a typical ruler to enlarge his/her own sphere of influence. Whoever fails to come on the scene is wiped out by the competition. As a result, the range of regulation as a whole systematically increases leading to the incessant growth of civil alienation (see conditions (a)-(c) in 2.1). After a time the society reaches a revolutionary interval.

The outcome of a revolution may be of two kinds: the revolution may be defeated or else the citizens may succeed in carrying it through. In the first case post-revolutionary terror becomes widespread. Its social function, independently of what particular rulers want to achieve, is to crush autonomous social relations through elimination of the most socially active citizens, viz. those who are centers of especially numerous connections of the "citizen-citizen" type. Such disarray of civil society results in the declassing of citizens thereby satisfying the rulers' interests in the best possible way; the only factor able to stop the pressure of power, civil resistance, is practically eliminated. The social function of post-revolutionary terror is to declass citizens. And it actually occurs when danger no longer exists for the rulers, as it is not a military but a purely political phenomenon.

The second possible outcome is the victory of citizens which soon turns out to be the victory of revolutionaries. They constitute a power elite inasmuch as they dispose of new means of coercion for the masses in revolt, not to mention the civil, national or red guards, are nothing but a means of repression and control. The revolutionary elite constitutes an embryo of the new class of rulers, and the civil revolution is, from the materialist point of view, a confrontation between the established ruling class and the developing class of rulers. That this conception is correct becomes evident after the victory of the masses. The revolutionary elite seizes a monopoly of the means of coercion and becomes a new class of rulers subject to the same regularities as the previous regime. Among revolutionaries there always appear people who crave power for power's

sake, and they will gather in their hands more and more decisions of increasing importance, thereby pushing aside the "passionate revolutionaries" whose influence decreases. After a time the latter are altogether eliminated as "the enemies of the people" and nothing disturbs the typical apparatchik in his bid for more and more power. The process brings about an incessant increase of the range of regulation and in effect institutes a new wave of class struggle directed against the new class of rulers hidden under revolutionary banners. The civil loop is completed and a new revolution takes place.

If the masses lose a new revolution, the declassing is brought about. If they succeed, the second generation of revolutionaries does what the first has done and after a time the second civil loop is completed. The outcome is that after at most a finite number of civil loops the citizens lose their struggle definitively and some repertory of the class of rulers carries out the declassing.

The declassing of citizens is inevitable within our idealizational model. It is what actually enables the class of rulers to accelerate the process of extending the range of their regulation. Soon, all that can be controlled is brought under control: the system reaches the state of totalization. In such a state there are no more areas of social life to conquer. But a typical ruler must, as always, enlarge his/her sphere of influence. Under our present assumptions there is only one way to keep the whole system in operation — a purge. Purges eliminate some rulers leaving room for competition among those remaining; they result thereby in a new expansion of the range of regulation. After a time, however, the expansion again reaches the state of totalization and a new purge becomes necessary. That is why there must be periodic purges. This state of affairs, and not the "madness of the despot", explains the fact that the forces of coercion are periodically directed against some of the rulers themselves.

Salvation comes thanks to the increasing ability of the masses of citizens to resist. Social life gradually passes from the official relations of the "citizen-ruler-citizen" type to a revival of autonomous social relations of the "citizen-citizen" type and in this way civil society gradually recovers. What results is the first, as yet limited, revolution embracing that part of the population in which the process of revalorization of autonomous social relations was most advanced. The influence of this local revolution on the entire class of citizens is not very great but it gives the class of rulers an opportunity to extricate itself from the state of self-subjugation that results in periodic purges. The chance for a victory and hence for a civil loop in this first revolution is rather low but as a result of its suppression a new system of relations between rulers and citizens,

based on the reduced sphere of regulation is established. In this way the class of rulers acquires room to compete and the purges are no longer necessary.

No political class can be, however, forced to take any direction whatsoever. The only direction it takes — and that spontaneously — is to increase its power; this is due to mechanisms of competition beyond anyone's control and, usually, intention. That is why the sphere of regulation grows inevitably. If it does not reach the state of totalization again, that is due to the masses of citizens. For on the strength of the dependency assumed in 2.1, a new revolution comes about, more popular than the first, since in the meantime new categories of citizens have extricated themselves from the declassed state. Such a trend of increasing revolutions, as seen in light of their social basis, is a characteristic feature of the new, post-totalizational, phase of the development of a purely political society. Because of its growing social base, the trend is also marked by the increased chance of victory, that is, by a civil loop. This implies that the society repeats its historical road (under new ideological banners at best) from the very beginning, including the declassing and totalizational stages. Fortunately, under our idealizing conditions the chances of victory of the citizens are not very high and the standard image of the movement of the society under consideration is the following: revolution — declassing — increasing autonomy — revolution on a wider social basis, etc.

Thanks to the process of incessant revalorization of social relations more and more citizens extricate themselves from their atomized state. There comes a point where the large majority of citizens turns out to be ready to oppose the system, then it proves impossible to apply the standard declassing strategy. If the civil loop is to be avoided, the only possibility for the rulers is to make concessions. The range of their regulation diminishes rapidly and the sphere of social autonomy increases correspondingly. But the mechanism of competition forces the class of rulers to reconquer the lost social territories, which process results in the next revolution, and so forth. In this way a new pattern of development comes into existence: revolution — concessions — revolutions on a wider social basis — increasing concessions, etc. The pattern is repeated until the state of social peace is attained, that is, until a new system of power is gradually formed, which will satisfy the citizenry by keeping the state of class peace is gradually formed.

2.3. Multilinearity of the social development in Model I

It is obvious even from the first glance and stressed in the standard expositions of the theory in question (see Nowak 1987a, 1991, pp. 64-65), that the model presents a multilinear path of the development of a purely political society. The reason lies in the revolutions each of which can either be successful or can result in the defeat of the masses. Each revolution thus opens next possibilities:

- (i) as a result of a lost revolution the next stage of Model I follows;
- (ii) in case of a successful revolution the whole line of development presented in Model I is repeated.

This leads immediately to developmental alternatives inherent in Model I:

- (Alt1) no-loop variant;
- (Alt2) variant with one civic loop a) in the phase of the revolution of the first type, or b) in the phase of the revolution of the second type;
- (Alt3) variant with two civic loops a) both in the phase of the revolution of the first type, b) one in the phase of the revolution of the first type and one in the phase of the revolution of the second type, c) both in the phase of the revolution of the second type;
- (Alt4) variant with three civic loops; etc.

It must be stressed that multilinearity of the historical process follows from the nature of the revolution, the phenomenon basic to the model. The conclusion reached is therefore not accidental — it results from the very nature of the theoretical construction in question.

3. The purely political society with a heterogeneous civil alienation (Model I*)

The material presented so far already allows to refute the objection that every theory of historical process is in its nature unilinear — it is not. It is more important, however, to understand the reasons for the multilinearity in models of historical development. Above, such a reason consisted in the possibility of different outcomes of a phenomenon, which results from the activity of factors primary to the model, the phenomenon of revolution. We will now turn to some alternative reasons

for multilinearity of the historical process resulting from the concretizations of Model I.

3.1. Idealizing conditions of Model I*

In Model I the relationship rulers/citizens is based on civil alienation, which itself is homogenous. However, an even simple observation tells us immediately that it matters to an average citizen whether the authorities prevent him/her from organizing a political party, dictate the price of grain, or impose atheism. The first may be almost unnoticed, the second may be a nuisance, whereas the third may result in a fury.

It might be hypothesized that the different preference manifested by the masses will effect also the preference distribution of the rulers. After all, it should not be surprising to note that it also makes a difference for the authorities what they control. It is very likely that rulers will prefer those spheres of power which offer the easiest opportunity for expansion, i.e. where people's resistance is the lowest. Since people are likely to resist more where their preferences are at their peak and less where they are relatively low, the rulers will enlarge their sphere of regulation in the latter not in the former area. An interesting phenomenon results: the preferences of the people will be exactly the opposite to those of the rulers. Hence the definition:

- (1) civil alienation is the ratio of the sphere of regulation to the total amount of social actions

is too crude. As a consequence the description of civil resistance (a-d, cf. 2.1) is also too rough to estimation.

How far should we go in specifying these divisions depends on additional assumptions. In this text we want to model the system of triple-rule, in which the disposers of the means of coercion in addition control the means of production and indoctrination. In such a socialist society, economy and culture become areas of *par excellence* political expansion. From the standpoint of triple-rulers these are simply spheres of regulation. An apparatus does not have any profit from the production of a factory; what he does have, however, is the power over that factory. Hence we should be able to conceptualize the economic (cultural) oppression as an attempt to expand the area of regulation, and the economic (cultural) resistance as an attempt to increase civil autonomy. In such a case there exists a common measure between the three spheres. Of course, this situation is limited to the system of triple-rule, in other cases the measures differ.

We should therefore distinguish three spheres of social actions in Model I*: political, economic and cultural. Similarly, civil resistance needs to be determined not only in terms of the total amount of actions regulated (or autonomous), but must also differentiate among these three spheres.

Let us be a little more precise. In light of the above one can clearly see that two theses of Model I are inadequate:

- (2) the class of rulers maximizes its sphere of regulation;
- (3) civil resistance depends on the level of civil alienation in a double bell fashion (conditions (a)-(d) in 2.1).

More accurately, these theses are adequate only if we make additional idealizing assumptions about the homogeneity of the interest of the class of rulers and the ruled.

- (i1) The interest of the rulers is equally satisfied by any increase of regulation.
- (i2) The interest of the ruled is equally satisfied by any increase of autonomy.

In other words, the following conditional is true:

- (C) if (i1) and (i2) (and other assumptions), then Model I.

Since (i1) and (i2) are idealizing conditions we need to waive them and thus concretize Model I. This will be the goal of the remainder of this text. We will try to sketch a materialistic model of a political society in a nonhomogeneous field of power divided between politics, economy and culture. The concretized model will be named 'I*':

3.2. Theoretical assumptions of Model I*: the expansiveness of triple-rulers

We have divided the field of social activity (social field, for short) into three spheres: political, economic and cultural. Let us waive assumption (i1) and consistently replace the assumption of Model I:

- (R-I) the interest of the rulers consists in maximizing the sphere of regulation (and consequently in minimizing the sphere of civil autonomy)

by a more specific one:

- (R-I*) the interest of the rulers consists in maximizing the sphere of regulation; moreover, the less is a given domain preferred by the people, the more is it in the interest of the rulers to increase regulation in this domain.

This seems true for the following reason. Given are people's preferences. Those preferences will accordingly determine where it is easiest for the rulers to increase their sphere of regulation. It is in areas where people are relatively indifferent that the new class of rulers will manage to gain the largest amount of control over people's actions. Equally, when the new class of rulers has solidified already it will expand first and most vigorously where people's preferences are the lowest.

In a concrete case where people's preferences are the highest in culture, and the lowest in politics, it is natural for the rulers to dominate the sphere of politics to the highest and culture to the least degree. In such a case, (R-I*) may be further specified:

- (R-I*) the interest of the rulers consists in maximizing the sphere of regulation, and for any subset Z of civil actions, the increase of the regulation by Z is more in the interest of rulers when Z represents political actions than when Z represents economic actions; the increase of the regulation by Z is more in the interest of rulers when Z represents economic actions than when Z represents cultural actions.

The rule of dynamics of power (1) in Model I is a consequence of the assumption about the interest of rulers (R-I) and the characteristics of the mechanism of competition — those who do not maximize their sphere of control over citizens are eliminated from the class of rulers. In model I* the interest of the rulers is diversified. We have spoken about their preferences being the opposite of the civil society (citizens) in a rather metaphorical way. Let us make clear what it amounts to.

Any given ruler, of course, has his or her own preferences. They may happen to be the same as those of the people, e.g. to prefer the sphere of culture, to keep with the above example. If the ruler tries to expand his regulation in a sphere most preferred by society he risks greater resistance and finally a rebellion sooner than if he had expanded elsewhere. So by and large, rulers led by an "instinct" (those who do not have it are selected away) will expand primarily in the sphere where people's preferences are at their lowest.

Thus the interest of the rulers first requires the elimination of (in our example) political autonomy. Accordingly, the strongest competition takes place among those who control political activities of the civil

society. Competition becomes weaker for those who are in charge of economy and weaker still for these rulers who control the spiritual sphere of the society. Those who are eliminated from the most important (from the point of view of the rulers) sphere of political control may be degraded to control in either one of the remaining two spheres. In such a way the class of rulers becomes hierarchized. The most skillful take care of politics, less skillful are delegated to control economy, whereas the least skillful will be responsible for culture. As a result, the fastest expansion could be observed in politics, then economy and the slowest expansion in culture. In addition, if under pressure rulers are forced to make concessions then (if such a decision belongs to them) the biggest concessions can be expected in culture, then in economy and finally in politics. This is so because, small concessions in culture are, in view of people's preferences, equivalent to large concessions in politics. Hence, rulers forced to make concessions will make those that minimize loss in the global sphere of regulation and at the same time satisfy the preferences of civil society.

3.3. Theoretical assumptions of Model I*: civil resistance

A unique alienation curve can be defined for each of the three subspheres of civil actions. Each of these curves can be characterized by its specific areas of class peace, of the first type revolution, of enslavement and of revolution of the second type. As a consequence of the concretization introduced above, for a civil society whose preferences are greatest in culture and lowest in politics, the following should be the case:

- (A) the area of class peace is biggest in the political subsphere, whereas it is smallest in culture;
- (B) the area of revolution of the first type starts earliest in culture and latest in politics;
- (C) the area of enslavement starts latest in the political domain and earliest in culture;
- (D) the area of revolution of the second type starts earliest in culture and latest in politics.

The economic sphere lies in between these two. In each subsphere of civil actions then the resistance curve has the same (double bell) shape although the peculiar areas have different positions (A)-(D).

3.4. Model I*

We now need to answer the question, how to describe civil resistance against triple-rulers in global terms. The answer can be found directly in assumptions of Model I*. As mentioned, the political component dominates the remaining two. In a purely political society with the class of triple-rulers, the criterion for expansion in any area of regulation is political. For instance, triple-rulers regulate economic actions not in order to maximize profit — they regulate them to maximize regulation. Similarly in the sphere of spiritual production — regulation is undertaken for the sake of regulation. All this leads us directly to the conclusion that any autonomous civil action, even economic or cultural, is a political action against triple-rulers. In socialism, everything becomes politics. If so then the global model of civil resistance should be of the same type as local models for the three spheres.

We can define the number of all possible civil actions as $n = n_p + n_e + n_c$ (where n_p is the number of possible political actions, n_e — the number of possible economic actions, n_c — the number of possible cultural actions) and the number of regulated actions as $r = r_p + r_e + r_c$ (where r_p is the number of regulated political actions, r_e — the number of regulated economic actions, etc.). Hence, global alienation can be defined as the ratio of the number of all regulated actions to the number of all possible actions, $Al = r/n$. Since we are considering three separate spheres, we can define political alienation $Al_p = r_p/n_p$, economic alienation: $Al_e = r_e/n_e$ and cultural alienation $Al_c = r_c/n_c$. Thus:

$$(5) \quad Al = (n_p \cdot Al_p + n_e \cdot Al_e + n_c \cdot Al_c)/n$$

If we now assume that all three spheres consist of the same number of actions (k), we can conclude that

$$(6) \quad Al = k \cdot (Al_p + Al_e + Al_c)/n, \quad \text{where } k = n_p = n_e = n_c$$

and this shows, as it was suspected, that the total alienation is a scaled sum of particular alienations.

If so then Model I* of global development of the triple-rule system will not be so different from Model I if social preferences are not very differentiated and lie close to each other. It will consist of the same phases of development, with the same basic variants (Alt1), (Alt2), (Alt3), ... In this sense the earlier supposition is confirmed: an ideal type of the purely political society is a good approximation of the system of

triple-rule (see Nowak 1984-85, p. 120). However, if social preferences are extreme (extremely high in one sphere and extremely low in another), which is of course possible, the shape of the modified global development curve will be very different. For simplicity, let us consider two spheres only. It is conceivable to obtain a curve with two areas of revolution of the first type. The first area of revolution of the first type would be due to the sphere of very high social preference, the second area accordingly — to the area of very low level of social preference.

3.5. *The sense of Model I*: ramification of the development of the triple-rule system*

It should be asked whether Model I*, aside of making the concepts a little more subtle, says anything new as compared with Model I. The answer is positive. In each society, masses may, and probably will, have different preferences. This means that the rulers accordingly dominate different spheres of social life and also the rate of their expansion in particular spheres will be different. In a society oriented primarily politically, and also economically, the triple-rulers will advance into culture and dominate the spiritual life. Accordingly, different actions on the part of the rulers will lead to revolutions of the first type. In a society oriented culturally, attempts to dominate primarily this sphere are likely to result in a rebellion. This sphere is also more likely to lead more quickly to the state of enslavement. Thus, if the rulers are strong enough to dominate the sphere very rapidly they can enslave people more quickly. At the same time, however, there is a greater risk that further attempts at regulating the most preferred sphere will result in civil awakening and lead to the revolution of the second type.

Different preferences of the masses lead to different curves of social resistance and in effect render different alternatives of the development of societies. Model I* allows us to distinguish further possible lines of social development. We not only have alternatives (Alt1), (Alt2), ... but each one of them has many variants depending on social preferences.

Call normal societies ones in which the people is marked by the above considered order of the preferred domains: culture, economics, politics. In such societies the order of domination will be reverse: at first the sphere of politics will be controlled, then economic life, finally the domain of customs, religion etc. On the other hand, in normal societies the order of withdrawal of the authorities from controlling civil society will be the following: first culture is released, then economics and at the very end political life is left.

Suppose that Polish society is a normal society in the above sense. This may be at least a partial explanation why the cultural sphere in Poland, with its strong position of the traditional peasantry and of Church, has never been dominated. This may also serve as an explanation why the order of liberation in socialism was in Poland actually this: at first control of science and arts (after 1956) and religion (after 1970) has been suspended, then control of economic life has been diminished (after 1980), finally the communist rulers have withdrawn even from controlling the political life (after 1988). It is not a mere accident that all the dates shown above are dates of mass movements of the Polish people.

An assessment that Polish society is normal is evidently arbitrary as it is based on uncontrolled data, perhaps on prejudices. The same holds for other assessments of the kind, for instance, that the East-German society is economically oriented. However, having adopted such a risky claim, one can explain with the aid of Model I* why, if we do not take the Soviet Union into account, the G.D.R. was a country in which there appeared the first mass movement against the socialist system. The answer is that Germans are economically oriented and the Stalinist strategy of conquering civil society was adopted to the standards of a normal society, i.e., politics was to be subordinated first, then economy, at the very end — culture. This strategy met the resistance in Germany (and in another economically oriented country, viz. Czechoslovakia — compare the great strike in Pilzn in 1953) because the second domain of subjugation proved there to be the first domain of social resistance. Subordinating the economy with all its well-known consequences (chaos, corruption etc.) ruining the mentality of a good worker had to be a really revolting factor there.

Another puzzle which can be explained in terms of Model I* is, why the first revolution in post-war history of Poland appeared actually in Poznań, notably a region with small, if not the smallest, revolutionary traditions in Polish history. However, actually this region, being in the neighbourhood of Germany and even a part of Germany for more than one century, has the greatest tradition of good labor in Poland. One may conjecture, that in 1956 people living there were still constituting an economically oriented sub-society of the Polish nation. Therefore, the socialistic (dis)order in the economy was much more painful there than in other regions of Poland.

4. *How theories of the historical process can be (ethically) admissible?*

The transition from Model I to Model I* shows clearly how groundless is the belief that any theory of historical process must produce unilinear models of historical development. Model I* does not introduce any significant modifications to what was presented in Model I as a general description of social development. It introduces, however, new source of ramification of the historical process creating new possibilities of development. There are then historiosophical models whose only justification for existence is that they deepen our understanding of the different developmental possibilities.

Why then does the thought that historiosophy must lead to unilinearity persist? Partially, it is due to the lack of understanding of the method of idealization used in the theory of historical development. It is possible, and it does happen from time to time, that social development is conceived as unilinear in the most idealized model of a theory. In such a case, principal factors determine the unilinearity of social changes. The most abstract model of an idealizational theory does not, however, describe real historical developments. What is claimed holds only under very strong idealizing assumptions. It may happen that when secondary factors are taken into consideration the developmental path will be modified so as to allow more than one line. Such a theory starts with a unilinear model but ends with a multilinear one.

As we have seen, the theory of the triple-rule system in non-Marxian historical materialism is multilinear from the very beginning. The concretization shown here increases this multinearity and leads us to a conclusion that any society has a developmental path of its own. This particular historiosophical theory is immune to the standard objections from the outset.

Another reason for the persistence of the standard objections against the theory of historical process is grounded in some moral prejudices. They mainly result from a suspicion that any attempt to build a theory of the historical process (processes) necessarily presupposes the "myth of historical necessity" which is to neglect the role that human beings play in history.

Sometimes, the objection in question is taken to imply the inevitability of historical development. Even if it is admitted that the development is multilinear, the charge of inevitability may be levelled in the sense that there is a necessary sequence of changes in each variant of the course of events. This is indeed the case in our models: each variant describes only one succession of phases of development. Yet, again, the description offered by the models is true only under numerous idealizing conditions.

The models are too poor to capture the historical reality where countless tendencies may counteract those which are accounted for in the model in their "pure form". The necessity of historical development under the idealizing conditions on which model I is based, can then be blocked in a given historical state of affairs, viz. when there are factors abstracted from in model I which counteract those considered in it. That is why the only relation between the idealizational statement of a model and reality is — with luck — that of statistical approximation. If the model is true, the best one could expect is that its idealizational hypotheses are fulfilled in a majority of cases and then only within a threshold of "admissible" deviations. There is no reason why this general claim — valid, we believe, for all empirical sciences — is not to hold for the theory of historical process. Therefore, idealizational theses of a historiosophic theory may be referred to historical reality only *via* statistical approximation; it can be claimed that the main trend captured by the model is actualized in all cases, but whether it can be observed or not depends on the numerous counterinfluences to which it is no doubt subject. Obviously, in these matters, it is not possible to apply numerical measures to deviations but claims of the sort are none the less familiar to us. For instance, we claim that Polish socialism is an approximation to socialism rather than to capitalism even though it is different from the ideal pattern due to the existence of private land ownership, an independent Church, etc.

What is necessary in ideal models need not be, and usually is not, necessary in actual history (not to mention the trivial fact that the necessity might be wrongly recognized, and consequently that the idealizational theses may be simply false). Historiosophy is not a dogmatic domain. Only certain philosophers of history are dogmatic, just like certain enemies of historiosophy.

Another misunderstanding arises from the view according to which the existence of "laws of history" undermines the differences between situations in which individuals may be sensibly said to be responsible for their acts and situations in which responsibility cannot be ascribed to them (Berlin 1984, p.71). Models of the theory of historical process, e.g. those considered above, do not by any means imply that people are deprived of freedom of choice and thus are not morally responsible for their acts. Let us consider a particular ruler, for instance. There is no mythical "necessity" to force him to widen the sphere of influence. The ruler can choose to pursue his ideal instead of pursuing his interests despite the threat of social, sometimes physical, demise. If he does choose to act against his interests, he will normally (except for some limiting cases) be eliminated from the ruling apparatus. His place will be occupied by someone without such scruples who acts like the majority of his colleagues.

Similarly, a capitalist may reject to maximize profits but if he persists in this attitude for a longer period of time he will be wiped out by competition. One can express the mechanism underlying this state of affairs thus. Only those people who act in accordance with certain regularities are able to survive as rulers, owners or priests. Those regularities do not, however, work "behind the backs" of agents, but in their acts; they remind of universals in the sense of Aristotle rather than Plato. All the regularities to which the global mechanism of power (and, similarly, of property and spiritual domination) is subject are not "given from without", but result from the discouraging fact that the majority of people facing the possibility of realizing their interests (more power, wealth, or spiritual authority) freely choose to realize them rather than not. This does not deny but, on the contrary, it presupposes their moral responsibility.

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